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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
The relevance of past convictions to sentences for current 
crimes has been one of the most frequently litigated issues 
under the regime of the federal sentencing guidelines. One 
vein in this seemingly limitless mine of jurisprudence is 
whether and when a federal defendant can bring a 
collateral attack challenging the constitutional validity of 
past convictions during his federal sentencing proceedings. 
The Supreme Court and this court have rejected such 
collateral attacks in Custis v. United States , 511 U.S. 485 
(1994), and United States v. Thomas, 42 F.3d 823 (3d Cir. 
1994), while recognizing two circumstances in which such 
attacks may be brought: (1) where the statute or sentencing 
guideline under which the defendant was sentenced 
provides for the right to bring such a collateral attack at 
sentencing; and (2) when the defendant's collateral attack, 
at sentencing, is based on an allegation that his right to 
counsel, as described in Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 
335 (1963), was violated during the underlying state court 
proceeding. 
 
This appeal, which arises out of a cocaine distribution 
case in which the defendant pled guilty to violating 21 
U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)C, extracts more ore from 
the Custis and Thomas vein. It presents the narrow 
question whether a defendant, during sentencing, can lodge 
a collateral attack based on an alleged denial of his sixth- 
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amendment right to a jury trial, thereby challenging the 
constitutionality of an underlying state-court conviction 
used to calculate his United States Sentencing Guidelines 
Criminal History Category under U.S.S.G. S 4A1.1. Because 
neither 21 U.S.C. S 841 nor U.S.S.G. S 4A1 explicitly 
provides defendants the right to make a collateral challenge 
during federal sentencing proceedings, and because the 
defendant's constitutional challenge is not based on an 
alleged Gideon violation, we hold that the District Court 
properly refused to entertain the defendant's collateral 
attack. We will therefore affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
 
I. 
 
On June 29, 1999, Cesar Escobales pled guilty to 
distributing 112.4 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
SS 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)C. The United States Probation 
Office for the District of Delaware prepared a pre-sentence 
investigation report ("the PSI"), which was revised to reflect 
objections made by Escobales's counsel. The Probation 
Office calculated Escobales's base offense level at 18, but 
reduced the overall offense level to 15 because of 
acceptance of responsibility. The Probation Office 
determined that Escobales had 4 criminal history points, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 4A1.1-2 points based on two prior 
state convictions and 2 points because he committed the 
instant offense while on probation. According to the table at 
Chapter 5, Part A of the U.S.S.G., a defendant with 4 
criminal history points is in criminal history category III. 
The sentencing range for a defendant with a criminal 
history of category III and an offense level of 15 is 24 to 30 
months. 
 
Escobales objected to the PSI's inclusion of one of his 
state convictions. He submitted that one of the two 
convictions--a third-degree assault charge--was obtained 
in violation of his constitutional right to trial by jury, 
because he pled guilty to the crime without first being made 
aware of his right to a jury trial by the state judge receiving 
his uncounseled plea.1 Had this assault conviction not been 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because we ultimately decide that we cannot reach the merits of this 
argument, we do not describe the legal precepts involved or the 
 
                                3 
  
included in Escobales's criminal history calculation, he 
would have had 3 criminal history points, his criminal 
history category would have been II, and his sentencing 
range would have been 21 to 27 months. 
 
The revised PSI accounted for Escobales's objection, and 
the Probation Office recommended rejecting it in light of 
this court's decision in United States v. Thomas , 42 F.3d 
823 (3d Cir. 1994). Thomas held that "when sentencing a 
defendant classified as a career offender under section 
4B1.1" of the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court, 
"cannot entertain a constitutional challenge to the 
underlying convictions" unless (1) "the statute under which 
the defendant is sentenced explicitly provides the right to 
attack collaterally prior convictions used to enhance the 
sentence;" or (2) the constitutional challenge to the 
underlying conviction is based on a claim that "the 
defendant's right to counsel has been denied." Id. at 824 
(citing Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1994)) 
(emphasis added). The defendant's remedy in such a case is 
to challenge the conviction in state court or tofile a 28 
U.S.C. S 2254 petition to attack collaterally the underlying 
state conviction. See Custis, 511 U.S. at 497. Should either 
of these challenges prove successful, the defendant can 
then "apply for reopening of any federal sentence enhanced 
by the state sentence" or file a 28 U.S.C.S 2255 petition 
challenging his federal sentence. Id. 
 
At Escobales's sentencing hearing, the Government 
argued that neither of Thomas's two preconditions for 
collaterally attacking an underlying state conviction during 
a federal sentencing hearing was present in Escobales's 
case. The Government also argued that, although Escobales 
was being punished pursuant to a different statute and 
guideline from the defendant in Thomas, the statutes and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
surrounding facts in detail. We do note, however, that gravamen of 
Escobales's complaint is that the state family court judge who received 
his plea did not inform him that if he refused to plead guilty to the 
assault charge, he could appeal any conviction arising out of a bench 
trial before the family court to the superior court, where he would be 
entitled to a de novo trial before a jury. 
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guidelines in the two cases were functional equivalents.2 
The Government therefore contended that, based on 
Thomas, it was appropriate for the District Court to 
consider the challenged conviction in sentencing Escobales, 
and that Escobales's constitutional challenge was being 
lodged at the wrong stage of the proceedings and in the 
wrong forum. 
 
The District Court adopted this reasoning and sentenced 
Escobales to 24 months in prison. The Court also imposed 
a fine and ordered that Escobales comply with certain post- 
release conditions. This appeal followed. The District Court 
had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. This court's 
jurisdiction is founded in 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(a)(2). 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
Escobales makes two arguments on appeal. First, he 
contends that his being denied his right to a jury trial is on 
a par with being denied the right to counsel, and therefore, 
that he should be able to attack collaterally his state 
conviction during his federal sentencing proceedings. In 
Custis, the Supreme Court rejected this type of argument: 
 
       Custis invites us to extend the right to attack 
       collaterally prior convictions used for sentence 
       enhancement beyond the right to have appointed 
       counsel established in Gideon [v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
       335 (1963)]. We decline to do so. We think that [the] 
       . . . failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant 
       [is] a unique constitutional defect. Custis attacks his 
       previous convictions claiming the denial of the effective 
       assistance of counsel, that his guilty plea was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Thomas involved a defendant who pled guilty to bank robbery, 18 
U.S.C. S 2113(a), and whose offense level and criminal history category 
were increased, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, because of his career 
offender status. See 42 F.3d at 823. Escobales pled guilty to distributing 
cocaine and was not classified as a career offender. Rather his criminal 
history category was calculated pursuant to U.S.S.G.S 4A1. 
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       knowing and intelligent, and that he had not been 
       adequately advised of his rights in opting for a 
       "stipulated facts" trial. None of these alleged 
       constitutional violations rises to the level of a 
       jurisdictional defect resulting from the failure to 
       appoint counsel at all. 
 
511 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added). 
 
Thomas read Custis to mean that only Gideon violations 
could be attacked collaterally during federal sentencing 
proceedings. See Thomas, 42 F.3d at 824; see id. (holding 
that district court sentencing Thomas could not entertain 
Thomas's claim that the "state judge [in the underlying 
state-court conviction] failed to inform [Thomas] of several 
of his constitutional rights when [Thomas] pleaded guilty"). 
Thomas's reading of Custis precludes us from broadening 
Custis's "Gideon exception" to right-to-jury-trial claims. 
 
Moreover, the right-to-jury-trial claim brought here by 
Escobales is analogous to the uninformed-guilty-plea 
claims rejected in both Custis and Thomas. In all three 
cases, the gravamen of the defendant's constitutional 
challenge was that his guilty plea was not knowing and 
intelligent because he was not informed of certain rights he 
would be waiving by entering his plea. Because Custis and 
Thomas declined to reach such claims when brought 
collaterally during sentencing, so must we. 
 
B. 
 
Escobales's second argument is that the statute under 
which he was sentenced explicitly provided him with the 
right to attack collaterally, at sentencing, the 
constitutionality of his underlying convictions. This 
argument is unavailing, however, because in advancing it 
Escobales is forced to rest his contention on a statute 
under which he was neither charged nor sentenced--21 
U.S.C. S 851. 
 
Escobales was charged with and pled guilty to violating 
21 U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)C. Had the government 
wished to pursue statutory enhancements for prior 
convictions, it could have moved under 21 U.S.C.S 851 to 
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seek such statutory enhancements to the maximum 
sentence provided for under S 841(b)(1)C. It did not do so. 
Instead, it relied on the criminal history category portion of 
the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. S 4A1.1, to account for Escobales's 
past misdeeds. Neither 21 U.S.C. S 841 nor U.S.S.G. S 4A1, 
in any of its subsections or commentary, explicitly provide 
the defendant with the right to attack his prior convictions 
collaterally during sentencing proceedings. See  21 U.S.C. 
S 841; U.S.S.G. S 4A1; Thomas, 42 F.3d at 824 & n.1 
(discussing S 4A1); see also United States v. Bacon, 94 F.3d 
158, 163 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996) ("At least eight other courts of 
appeals have extended Custis to Guidelines cases.") 
(collecting cases). Commentary to S 4A1 makes this point 
clear: 
 
       Sentences resulting from convictions that (A) have been 
       reversed or vacated because of errors of law or because 
       of subsequently discovered evidence exonerating the 
       defendant, or (B) have been ruled constitutionally 
       invalid in a prior case are not to be counted. With 
       respect to the current sentencing proceeding, this 
       guideline and commentary do not confer upon the 
       defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior 
       conviction or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise 
       recognized in law . . . . 
 
U.S.S.G. S 4A1.2 cmt. 6 (1998) (emphasis added). Therefore, 
pursuant to Custis and Thomas, Escobales did not have the 
statutory right to attack his state conviction when the 
District Court was sentencing him. 
 
Escobales nonetheless argues that 21 U.S.C. S 851 
explicitly provides for such a right. In fact, S 851(c) does so, 
as is detailed in the margin, and as was noted in Custis, 
511 U.S. at 491-92, and recent commentary to the 
Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. S 4A1.2 cmt. 6 (1998) ("21 U.S.C. 
S 851 expressly provides that a defendant may collaterally 
attack certain prior convictions.").3  However, the right 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 851(c) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       (1) If the person denies any allegation of the information of prior 
       conviction, or claims that any conviction alleged is invalid, he 
shall 
       file a written response to the information. . . . The court shall 
hold a 
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provided for in S 851(c) is not implicated in this case. As we 
have held elsewhere, when a defendant is not being 
sentenced pursuant to a S 851 statutory  enhancement--i.e., 
one that exceeds the statutory maximum embodied in the 
Guideline's sentencing ranges--the defendant is not entitled 
to rely on the procedural protections contained inS 851 to 
challenge sentencing determinations such as his criminal 
history category, or "score" (U.S.S.G. S 4A1.1); the 
" `likelihood that he will commit further crimes' " (U.S.S.G. 
S 4A1.3); and his "career offender status" (U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.1). United States v. Davis, 969 F.2d 39, 47-48 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (holding so and collecting numerous court of 
appeals cases holding similarly). For these reasons, 
Escobales cannot rely on S 851 to invoke the sentencing 
court's collateral review power to attack an underlying 
conviction that was relied upon by the District Court in 
determining Escobales's criminal history points and 
criminal history category. 
 
Therefore, the judgment of the District Court will be 
affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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       hearing to determine any issues raised by the response which would 
       except the person from increased punishment. . . . 
 
        (2) A person claiming that a conviction alleged in the information 
       was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States 
       shall set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with 
       particularity in his response to the information. The person shall 
       have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on any 
       issue of fact raised by the response. . . . 
 
21 U.S.C. S 851(c). 
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